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Abstract—The amount of personal information contributed by
individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites
has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers un-
precedented opportunities for data analytics research in various
domains of societal importance including medicine and public
policy. The results of these analyses can be considered a public
good which benefits data contributors as well as individuals who
are not making their data available. At the same time, the release
of personal information carries perceived and actual privacy risks
to the contributors. Our research addresses this problem area.
In our work, we study a game-theoretic model in which
individuals take control over participation in data analytics
projects in two ways: 1) individuals can contribute data at
a self-chosen level of precision, and 2) individuals can decide
whether they want to contribute at all (or not). From the analyst’s
perspective, we investigate to which degree the research analyst
has flexibility to set requirements for data precision, so that
individuals are still willing to contribute to the project, and the
quality of the estimation improves.
We study this tradeoff scenario for populations of homo-
geneous and heterogeneous individuals, and determine Nash
equilibria that reflect the optimal level of participation and
precision of contributions. We further prove that the analyst can
substantially increase the accuracy of the analysis by imposing a
lower bound on the precision of the data that users can reveal.
Index Terms—Non-cooperative game, public good, privacy,
population estimate, data analytics, non-monetary incentives
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The seminal “How much Information Project?” report pub-
lished in 2000 concluded that between 1 and 2 exabytes of
unique information were produced worldwide per year which
translated into about 250 megabytes of information for every
human being [1], [2]. While those figures were (and are still)
largely driven by commercial production of information, in
recent years the amount of personal information produced
by individuals has grown substantially. Now, Facebook alone
absorbs about 220 petabytes of user-contributed data each year
[3]. Recognizing the opportunities to economically benefit
from this growth, personal data has been heralded as the
“New Oil” of the 21st Century [4]. Similarly, opportunities are
increasingly taken advantage of to utilize the data for research.
From the individual’s perspective the latter trend results in a
tradeoff calculus.
On the one hand, individuals recognize that many complex
challenges with societal importance, such as public health
considerations, market-research or political decision-making
[5], may benefit from a more rigorous analytic treatment,
thanks to data analytics research and the newly-won abundance
of personal information. From this perspective, many analytic
results that are based on individuals’ personal data can be
interpreted as public goods with societal importance. For
example, advancements to better understand certain illnesses
do not only potentially benefit the contributors of personal
data, but are often made accessible to people in a particular
domain (e.g., citizen of a country, individuals in a certain
social status or demographic category, or everybody).
On the other hand, the same individuals have justified
privacy concerns about the release of their personal data. The
reasons for privacy concerns can be quite diverse as outlined
in Solove’s privacy taxonomy [6]. Individuals may perceive
the release and use of their data as an intrusion of their
personal sphere [7], [8], or as a violation of their dignity [9]. In
addition, they may fear this data can be abused for unsolicited
advertisements, or social and economic discrimination (e.g.,
[10], [11]).
The published studies demonstrate the need to organize the
collection of personal data when facing this users’ tradeoff
scenario, by implementing effective control and participation
mechanisms. It has been shown that a majority of individuals
consider it as important to be able to exercise control over
the release of their personal data [12]. For example, a number
of empirical studies have provided evidence for such desires
for control in the medical domain [13]–[15]. Moreover, even
if data privacy provisions are met, many respondents would
still require notice and consent over their medical data release
[14]–[16]. Finally, several studies show a high overall concern
for certain data releases. For example, a meta-review of
published surveys showed that in some contexts a majority of
respondents were entirely uncomfortable with health research
if effective notice and consent practices were absent [17].
Similar findings can be shown for other problem domains.
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B. Problem Statement and Approach
Our research addresses the problem area identified in the
above section. In this paper, we propose individuals’ incentives
to participate in data analysis projects. These individuals face a
tradeoff between having privacy cost associated with their data
release, but also deriving benefits from the analysis’ results.
We are particularly motivated by the scenario when data
about individuals is already stored in a secure database for a
different primary purpose (e.g., social networking or medical
services). An analyst can then request the participation of
individuals in a data analysis project (via a notice and consent
process with negligible cost) that provides a public good. More
precisely, individuals make decisions about the release of a
private value given a population-relevant metric. The analyst
has the objective of accurately estimating the associated pop-
ulation average for all individuals.
Our main focus is on understanding the incentives of
individuals to participate, and of the analyst to shape this
decision-making process. From each individual’s perspective,
control over participation takes two forms: 1) individuals can
contribute data at a self-chosen level of precision, and 2)
individuals can decide whether they want to contribute at
all (or not). From the analyst’s perspective, we investigate
to which degree the research analyst has flexibility to set
requirements for data precision, so that individuals are still
willing to contribute to the project, and the quality of the
estimation improves.
Our work assumes that incentives for participation are non-
monetary; that is, the main driver for data contributions is the
interest in the derived public good. We base this assumption
on the observation that direct monetary compensation for
personal information has so-far received very little traction
in the market for personal information, and that it meets little
acceptance in consumer surveys.1
We follow a game-theoretic approach to investigate the
outlined trade-off calculus. We iteratively develop a model,
where the starting point is a simplified version of the work
by [18], that captures the interaction between an analyst and
a set of individuals who have control over the release of
information to the analyst. We conduct a rigorous analysis and
derive concrete results about the precision of contributions, the
quality of the population estimate, and the overall willingness
to contribute to the project.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we consider critical facets of realistic pri-
vacy decision-making, striking a good balance between model
complexity and potential impact. We rigorously analyze a
general model where users optimize a cost composed of an
individual privacy cost and an estimation cost that captures the
public good component of the analyst’s estimation, both given
by arbitrary functions satisfying relatively mild assumptions.
1While related empirical data is sparse, a survey reported that only about
25% of the surveyed population would accept monetary compensation for per-
sonal information [12]. In contrast, offering discounts or free products/services
for personal information is a common practice.
In particular, we consider a general case with a continuous
privacy cost function which allows users to choose a privacy
level in a continuum of choices (and not simply a 0-1 choice).
We first analyze the homogeneous agents case, and then
we extend our results to the case of heterogeneous agents,
providing in detail the actions the analyst should take in order
to improve the estimation. Evidence that privacy concerns
are heterogeneous is a particularly central cornerstone of the
privacy literature [19], and such an extension is fundamental
for the applicability of the model.
For both the homogeneous and the heterogeneous case, we
determine Nash equilibria indicating the number of contrib-
utors and the optimal contribution levels by the individuals.
We further prove that the analyst can increase the population
estimate’s accuracy simply by imposing a lower bound on the
precision of the data that users can reveal (i.e., by restricting
the level of precision of data contributions). While, for a fixed
population of users providing data, increasing the precision
of each data point clearly improves the population estimate’s
precision, the surprising and important aspect of our result lies
in that the scheme remains incentive compatible, i.e., users
are still willing to provide data with a higher precision rather
than dropping out. We also show how to tune the minimum
precision level the analyst should set in order to optimize the
population estimate’s accuracy. In our numerical simulations,
we find a maximum improvement of the population estimate’s
accuracy in the order of 20− 40%.
We further provide extensions of our modeling framework.
First, we discuss a two-stage game in which the analyst
may first recruit participants that commit to provide private
data with a minimum precision; and only in a second stage,
these agents would be asked to disclose their information.
This captures scenarios in which agents are recruited for
specific studies. Second, we also address the issue of costly
acquisition of agents and their data for analysis purposes.
While the no-cost-per-agent assumption we make throughout
the remainder of the paper is a standard approach in most of
the literature on public goods, we believe that certain practical
scenarios require the appreciation of cost considerations, and
this extension further completes our framework.
Our results provide a widely applicable method to increase
the provision of a public good above voluntary contributions,
simply by restricting the agents’ strategy spaces. This method
is attractive by its simplicity compared for instance to other
schemes that involve monetary transfers; and could find uti-
lization in other public good contexts.
Understanding the trade-off between privacy, the quality
of data analysis results, and willingness-to-participate in such
projects is of current and growing importance. Analysts should
not rely on overly broad or ineffective (take-it-or-leave-it)
notice and consent procedures that do not accurately reflect
individuals’ preferences. In many privacy-sensitive scenarios
such as involving medical data it is particularly unethical to
deprive individuals of their opportunities to make decisions
about their data, and whether they want to be involved in
certain analysis projects. However, better insights about the
involved incentive structures are needed to guide public policy
and advancements of privacy-aware data analysis.
Preliminary versions of some of the results presented in
this paper appeared in our short paper [20], in the context of a
simplified model with monomial privacy cost, linear estimation
cost and homogeneous agents. Here, we provide results for
the general framework introduced above that relaxes such as-
sumptions, we provide detailed results of practical importance
on how the analyst should optimally selected the minimum
precision level, and we provide several further extensions. In
Section IV-C, we also provide more detailed results in the
simplified setting of [20], to qualitatively illustrate the results
of the present paper.
D. Roadmap
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
review related work. We develop and describe our model in
Section III. We conduct our analysis in detail in Section IV on
a canonical case of homogeneous agents. We extend the results
to heterogeneous agents in Section V. We discuss extensions
to our model in Section VI, and conclude in Section VII. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
II. RELATED WORK
Our model draws on different lines of research including
work on privacy in the context of data analytics, and game
theoretic and public goods models. We also briefly review
technical and cryptographic approaches, and behavioral re-
search on control and data sharing.
Research on the optimal design of experiments assumes
that already the stage of data collection can be influenced
by the analyst in order to improve the learning of a linear
model [21], [22]. In this paper, we allow the analyst to require
data contributions at a certain level of precision to improve
the computation of a population estimate, which is a related
concept. Optimal design of experiments has been studied
from the perspective of incentives [23], or with the scope of
obtaining an unbiased estimator [24]. We propose to improve
the design of experiments focusing on the privacy concerns of
the agents.
Privacy-preserving techniques in the context of data ana-
lytics have a long history. Some recent papers propose new
approaches, which allow users to protect their privacy selling
aggregates of their data [25], [26]. The more classical frame-
work of -differential privacy [27], [28], assumes that data are
perturbed after an analysis has been conducted on unmodified
inputs. That is, the analyst is considered trustworthy. In this
framework, researchers have also studied the role of incentives
[29]–[32]. Our work differs, as we assume agents to be re-
leasing their data independently, and an untrusted data analyst
which motivates perturbations of data before submission. The
idea of affecting the level of precision of released personal
data, adding noise in advance of data analysis has been studied
in the context of privacy-preserving data-mining (see, e.g.,
[33], [34]) and specific application scenarios such as building
decision trees [35], clustering [36], and association rule mining
[37]. More recently, bounds have been derived on generic
information-theoretic quantities and statistical estimation rates
under a local privacy model which preserves the privacy of
agents even from the learner (similarly to adding noise before
revealing data) [38].
Recent work has also studied the combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem when an analyst may buy unbiased samples
of data from different providers with given but potentially
heterogeneous variance-price combinations [39]. In another
recent working paper, analysts can access unbiased samples
of private data by compensating data subjects for their data
release according to their preferences [40]. Those studies are
complementary to our work in which data subjects individually
decide in a game-theoretic framework on the degree of data
accuracy given a trade-off between their privacy and the
determination of a socially valuable population estimate.
From a mechanism design perspective, scenarios have been
studied where survey subjects are assumed to potentially
misreport their private values [41], [42], however, these be-
haviors are not studied in the context of a non-cooperative
scenario. A mechanism design perspective is taken in [43]
where the authors introduce monetary payments to create
incentives for agents to give high quality data. Here, we
do not consider monetary payments. A strategic approach is
followed in [18], where an analyst performs a linear regression
based on users’ perturbed data. The authors in [18] treat the
estimation accuracy as a public good and study the equilibrium
accuracy achieved without introducing monetary payments and
the resulting price of anarchy. Our starting point is a simplified
version of the model in [18]. We continue this line of research
by studying the benefits of restricting potential perturbation
on the population estimate accuracy, and the incentives for
participation in a game-theoretic framework.
Our research is also relevant to the context of the provi-
sioning of public goods [44]. Our results show a new way of
increasing the public good provision by restricting the agents’
possible actions, as opposed to using monetary incentives. In
addition, studies on interdependent privacy which capture the
idea that data sharing by one agent impacts the privacy of other
connected agents is complementary to our work [45], [46].
We model the scenario when sharing creates privacy risks for
individuals, but positive benefits for all agents.
The aforementioned theoretical works are complemented by
technical approaches (which do not utilize insights from game-
theory) such as secure hardware-based private information
retrieval which can be applied, for example, in the context
of online behavioral advertisement [47]; see also other ap-
proaches for privacy-preserving online targeted advertisements
[48]. Similarly, multi-party secure computation has been used
to facilitate the fitting of logistic regression when data are
held by separate parties [49], and homomorphic encryption has
been applied to the scenario of linear regression [50]. Secure-
computation notions of privacy have also been used in com-
bination with game theory for privacy-preserving mechanism
design [51], [52].
To facilitate the privacy negotiation process between a data
subject and an analyst, different technical protocols have been
proposed. Several works are connected to the Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences Project (P3P) which offers a protocol allow-
ing data collectors (e.g., websites) to declare their intended use
of information they collect about data subjects [53], and also
provides agent tools for the user to manage those data requests
[54], [55]. More recent work, for example, addresses specific
problem areas such as personalization [56]. Those mechanisms
allow for user-specified policies regarding participation, but
also minimum requirements for (not necessarily truthful) data
sharing as specified by the analyst.
Research on user preferences and behaviors with respect to
privacy has produced several results relevant to the context of
our work. A survey study has shown that over 90% of the
respondents agreed with the definition of privacy as control
of personal information [12] which presumably would include
an interest to decide over the participation in data analysis
projects. In hypothetical scenarios, individuals typically report
high attitudinal valuations for their private data [57]. However,
in experiments with actual private data transfers researchers
have observed low thresholds for the release of such data in
exchange for free services/goods or discounts [19], [58], [59].
A root cause for this privacy dichotomy is the complexity
of understanding personal information exchanges and their
consequences [12].
The intricacies of human decision making have also been
studied specifically focusing on the notion of control over
information exchanges. Laboratory and online experiments
have shown that control options have to be added with care
to practically relevant scenarios [60]–[62]. For example, such
options can elevate individuals’ propensity to engage in riskier
disclosures because their mere presence can contribute to a
lowering of concerns over privacy [60]. Another experimental
study found that allowing individuals to customize personal
data exchanges does not increase the number of transactions
even though individuals were able to exclude unwanted aspects
of those transactions [63]. Overall the understanding of the in-
volved attitudes and behaviors is still work in progress. In our
paper, we propose a process that is relatively straightforward
to implement and to understand from a user perspective. How-
ever, approaches that fully accommodate the stated behavioral
hurdles remain the subject of future work for behavioral as
well as theoretical scientists.
III. THE MODEL
In this section, we present our model in detail. We describe
the strategic interaction between the individuals (which we
also refer to as agents), whose information is contained in
a data repository, and how the analyst, wishing to observe
the data and to perform a statistical analysis, may modify the
estimation by varying selected parameters. The linear model
approach we take here builds on the work of [18].
A. The Data Repository of Personal Data
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, whose
personal data are contained in the data repository. In particular,
we suppose that each agent i ∈ N is associated with a
private variable yi ∈ R, which contains sensitive information.
Throughout our analysis, we suppose that there exists yM ∈ R,
s.t., the private variables are of the form
yi = yM + i, ∀i ∈ N, (1)
where i are i.i.d., zero-mean random variables with finite
variance σ2 < ∞, which capture the inherent noise. We
stress that we make no further assumptions on the noise; in
particular, we do not assume it is Gaussian. As a result, our
model applies to a wide range of statistical inference problems,
even cases where the distribution of variables is not known.
Paramter yM represents the mean of the private variables
yi, and its knowledge is valuable to the analyst, for example
as it allows him to predict the private variable of any agent
whose data cannot be known (because it is not contained in the
repository at that given moment, kept private by its owner, is
not accessible due to limited computing resources, etc.). The
analyst wishes to observe the available private variables yi and
to compute their average as an estimation of yM . In our model,
we suppose that the analyst does not know the mean yM , that
he wishes to estimate, but he knows the variance σ2. We argue
that observing the variability of an attribute in a population is
easier than estimating the mean, both for the analyst and for
the population (in [64], for example, the authors show how
individuals value their age and weight information according
to the relative variability).
B. The Precision and the Analyst’s Estimation
We suppose that the analyst cannot directly access the
private variables, rather she needs to ask the agents for their
consent to be able to retrieve the information. As such, the
agents have full control over their own private variables, and
they have the choice to authorize or to deny the analyst’s
request. In particular, if wishing to contribute, but concerned
about privacy, an agent can authorize the access to a perturbed
value of the private variable. The perturbed variable has
the form y˜i = yi + zi, where zi is a zero-mean random
variable with variance σ2i . We assume that the {zi}i∈N are
independent and are also independent of the inherent noise
variables {i}i∈N . In practice, the agent chooses a given
precision λi which corresponds to the inverse of the aggregate
variance (inherent noise, plus artificially added noise) of the
perturbed variable y˜i, i.e.,
λi = 1/(σ
2 + σ2i ) ∈ [0, 1/σ2], ∀i ∈ N.
In the choice of the precision level, we have the following two
extreme cases:
(i) when λi = 0, agent i has very high privacy concerns.
This corresponds to adding noise of infinite variance or,
equivalently, this represents the fact that agent i denies
the access to her data;
(ii) when λi = 1/σ2, agent i has very low privacy concerns.
This corresponds to authorizing the access to the real
private variable yi, without adding any additional noise
to the data.
The strategy set [0, 1/σ2] contains all the possible choices
for agent i: denying, authorizing, or any intermediate level of
precision (which captures a wide range of privacy concerns
as documented in behavioral studies [19]). We denote by λ =
[λi]i∈N the vector of the precisions.
Once each agent i ∈ N has made her choice about the
level of precision λi and, consequently, the perturbed variable
y˜i has been computed, the analyst has access to both the set of
precisions and the set of perturbed variables. Then, the analyst
estimates the mean as
yˆM (λ) =
∑
i∈N λiy˜i∑
i∈N λi
, (2)
where perturbed variables with higher precision (i.e., smaller
variance) receive a larger weight. This estimator is the standard
generalized least squares estimator. It minimizes a weighted
square error in which the i-th term is weighted by the precision
of the perturbed variable y˜i. This estimator is unbiased, i.e.,
E[yˆM ] = yM , and has variance
σ2M (λ) = E[(yˆM (λ)− yM )2] =
1∑
i∈N λi
∈ [σ2/n,+∞].
(3)
In our model, the analyst aims at estimating the mean yM ,
e.g., to be able to predict some additional private variables.
Then, it is reasonable to assume that the analyst would use this
estimator, as it is “good” for several reasons. In particular, it
coincides with the maximum-likelihood estimator for Gaussian
noise and, most importantly, it has minimal variance amongst
the linear unbiased estimators for arbitrary noise distributions.
In the estimation, we have the following two extreme cases:
(i) when λi = 0 for each i ∈ N , the variance (3) is infinite.
This corresponds to the situation in which each agent
denies the access to her data, and then the analyst cannot
estimate yM ;
(ii) when λi = 1/σ2 for each i ∈ N , the analyst estimates
yM with variance σ2/n, resulting only from the inherent
noise. This corresponds to the situation in which each
agent is authorizing the access to her data with maximum
precision, i.e., no agent is perturbing her private variable.
For any level of precision in [0, 1/σ2]n, the estimated variance
will be in [σ2/n,+∞]. The set of precision vectors for which
the estimator has a finite variance is [0, 1/σ2]n \ {(0, . . . , 0)}.
C. The Estimation Game Γ
We next describe the interaction between the agents that
results in their choices of precisions. We assume that each
agent i ∈ N wishes to minimize a cost function Ji :
[0, 1/σ2]n → R¯+, s.t., for each λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]n,
Ji(λ,λ−i) = ci(λi) + f(λ), (4)
where we use the standard notation λ−i to denote the col-
lection of actions of all agents but i. The cost function Ji of
agent i ∈ N comprises two non-negative components. The
first component ci : [0, 1/σ2] → R+ represents the privacy
attitude of agent i, and we refer to it as the privacy cost:
it is the (perceived or actual) cost that the individual incurs
on account of the privacy violation sustained by revealing the
private variable perturbed with a given precision. The second
component f : [0, 1/σ2]n → R¯+ is the estimation cost, and
we assume that it takes the form f(λ) = F (σ2M (λ)) where
F : [σ2/n,+∞) → R+ if the variance is finite, and +∞
otherwise. It represents how well the analyst can estimate the
mean yM and it captures the idea that it is not only in the
interest of the analyst, but also of the agents, that the analyst
can determine an accurate estimate of the population average
yM .
In our model, the accuracy of the estimate can be understood
as a public good, to which each user contributes with her
choice of precision λi, at a given privacy cost. From this
perspective, the assumption that the estimation cost is the same
for all agents mirrors the usual standard assumption in the
public good literature. Throughout our analysis, we make two
additional assumptions:
Assumption 1: The privacy costs ci : [0, 1/σ2] → R+, i ∈
N , are twice continuously differentiable, non-negative, non-
decreasing, strictly convex and s.t. ci(0) = c′i(0) = 0.
Assumption 2: Function F : [σ2/n,+∞) → R+ is twice
continuously differentiable, non-negative, non-decreasing and
strictly convex.
To describe the strategic interaction between the agents, we
define the estimation game Γ =
〈
N, [0, 1/σ2]n, (Ji)i∈N
〉
with
set of agents N , strategy space [0, 1/σ2] for each agent i ∈ N
and cost function Ji given by (4).
D. The Modified Estimation Game Γ(S, η)
As we shall see (Section IV-A), game Γ has a unique Nash
equilibrium for which the variance of the estimation is larger
than the optimal one (σ2/n) due to the excess noise added
by agents to protect their privacy. We further investigate the
situation in which the analyst can modify the game and try
to mitigate the effect of agents’ privacy concerns in order to
reduce the estimation cost (i.e., to improve the accuracy of the
estimation obtained). Specifically, the analyst can implement
the following two variations of the model. First, she can choose
a minimum precision level η ∈ [0, 1/σ2], which is equivalent
to fixing a maximum variance for the noise that agents can
add to perturb their data. As it is not practically possible to
force agents to authorize the access to their data with a given
precision, we still assume that the agents can choose to deny
the authorization, which is equivalent to selecting a precision
level equal to zero. Second, the analyst can request the access
to the personal data to only a subset S ⊆ N of agents, with
s = |S| (for example, excluding those agents who are the most
concerned about privacy).
In the modified game, the agents are informed of the subset
of individuals who are asked to reveal their personal data,
and of the minimum precision level η. They choose their
precision λi in the range imposed by the analyst [η, 1/σ2]
or decide to deny the access, i.e., select their precision
equal to 0. To analyze the strategic interaction between the
agents in this variation, we define the game Γ(S, η) =
〈
S,
[{0} ∪ [η, 1/σ2]]s, (Ji)i∈S〉 (where the cost function Ji
is still given by (4)), which is identical to Γ, except for the
restricted set of agents and the restricted strategy space.
Observe that the original game Γ is a special case of this
modified game Γ(S, η), when S = N and η = 0. We analyze
the games Γ and Γ(S, η) as complete information games
between the agents, i.e., we assume that the set of agents,
the action sets (in particular, when present, the value of the
parameter η) and the costs are known by all the agents.
IV. THE HOMOGENEOUS AGENT CASE
In this section, we detail the analysis in the symmetric case
where all the agents have identical privacy concerns, i.e., we
assume that the privacy cost functions of all agents are the
same: ci(·) = c(·) for each i ∈ N . This special case highlights
the key aspects of our approach and provides some interesting
preliminary results that yield intuitive interpretations. We will
generalize our results to the heterogeneous case in Section V.
A. The Estimation Game in the Homogeneous Case
We first analyze the estimation game Γ, in which all the
agents in N are playing and the analyst allows them to
choose any precision level between 0 and 1/σ2. A Nash
equilibrium (in pure strategy) of this game is a strategy profile
λ∗ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]n satisfying
λ∗i ∈ arg min
λi∈[0,1/σ2]
Ji(λi,λ
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ N. (5)
The game Γ with strategy space [0, 1/σ2] is a special case
of the game in [18], where the existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium is established. However, our specific assumptions
allow us to characterize the equilibrium in more detail:
Theorem 1: The game Γ has a unique Nash equilibrium λ∗
s.t. λ∗i = λ
∗ > 0 for each i ∈ N .
The proof of this result exploits the fact that game Γ
is a potential game to characterize the Nash equilibrium.
Interestingly, we observe that non-participation by everybody,
i.e., λ = (0, . . . , 0), cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, as the
estimation cost diverges at λ = (0, . . . , 0), every agent has
a profitable deviation from this point since contributing any
positive λi brings the estimation cost down to a finite cost.
Note, however, that this is not an artifact of the model, as it
remains true if we assume that the estimation cost is bounded
but large enough to exceed the privacy cost.
We observe that, as a consequence of the symmetry of
the game in the homogeneous case, all the agents at equi-
librium choose the same precision level, which is a function
λ∗ = λ∗(n) of the total number of agents n. Then, from the
discussion above, it is clear that λ∗ cannot be zero, so that all
agents contribute a positive precision.
Due to the arbitrariness of the functions F (·) and c(·), the
unique Nash equilibrium cannot be written in closed form.
However, it is easily computable in practice either as the
minimum of the potential function (which is convex) or as
the unique solution of the following fixed point problem:
λ = g(n, λ),
where function g : N∗ × [0, 1/σ2] → [0,+∞] is defined for
each λ ∈ (0, 1/σ2] and for each n ∈ N∗ as
g(n, λ) = min
{√
F ′
(
1
nλ
)
1
n2c′(λ)
, 1/σ2
}
and is defined by continuity as limλ→0+ g(n, λ) for λ = 0 and
for each n ∈ N∗.
Given the unique Nash equilibrium λ∗(n), the variance (in
Equation (3)) of the estimate of yM obtained by the analyst at
equilibrium is also a function of n, and given by the following
expression:
σ2M (λ
∗(n)) =
1
nλ∗(n)
. (6)
In Propositions 1 and 2 below, we derive the properties of the
equilibrium precision and of the corresponding variance, when
the number of agents varies.
Proposition 1: The equilibrium precision level λ∗(n) satis-
fies:
(i) λ∗(n) is a non-increasing function of the number n of
agents, and
(ii) limn→+∞ λ∗(n) = 0.
Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium contribution of each
agent decreases as the number of agents increases (Part (i)).
This is a standard property in public good problems as agents
choose their equilibrium contribution such that the marginal
increase in the contribution cost equates the marginal decrease
in the estimation cost, and the marginal effect of a single agent
decreases when the number of agent increases. Proposition 1-
(ii) shows that, in the limit when n becomes very large, the
contribution of each agents tends to zero (i.e., each agent adds
a variance tending to infinity to her data). It is interesting to
notice that, given that the equilibrium prevision level λ∗(n)
goes to zero as n goes to infinity, the variance (6) cannot
decrease in 1/n as in the standard case of the empirical mean
of iid random variables of equal variance. This is because,
here, the variance of each data point (or random variable)
increases as the number of points increases. Yet, as the next
proposition shows, the variance of the mean’s estimate is still
non-increasing.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium variance of the estimate of
yM satisfies:
(i) σ2M (λ
∗(n)) is a non-increasing function of the number
of agents n, and
(ii) limn→+∞ σ2M (λ
∗(n)) = 0.
Proposition 2-(i) shows that, for the analyst, it is always
better to have a larger number of agents giving data despite
the fact that, when the number of agents increases, each
agent gives data with smaller precision (see Proposition 1).
Proposition 2-(ii) analyzes the case of a large number of agents
n. Interestingly, when n gets large, the variance goes to zero,
though at a rate smaller than 1/n as mentioned above. (We
give an expression of the rate in Section IV-C for special
functions F and c).
B. The Modified Estimation in the Homogeneous Case
We now move to the case where the analyst can restrict
the set of agents, thereby asking to access the data of only
a subgroup of them, and potentially introducing a minimum
precision level η ∈ [0, 1/σ2]. The final goal is to improve
the estimation accuracy; formally, to estimate the mean yM
with a variance strictly smaller than σ2M (λ
∗(n)). We assume
that the set S ⊆ N of agents who can authorize access to
their data (i.e., who are solicited by the analyst) is fixed, and
we analyze how the estimation varies while moving only the
parameter η. This variant is modeled by the game Γ(S, η)
defined in Section III-D, where η is now the only variable of
the model. We suppose that the equilibrium precision level for
the game Γ(S, 0) is s.t. λ∗(s) 6= 1/σ2 since, otherwise, the
estimation would already be optimal with variance σ2/s for
η = 0.
A Nash equilibrium (in pure strategy) of the game Γ(S, η)
is a strategy profile λ∗ ∈ [{0} ∪ [η, 1/σ2]]s satisfying
λ∗i ∈ arg min
λi∈{0}∪[η,1/σ2]
Ji(λi,λ
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ S. (7)
In the following theorem, we show that, if the analyst chooses
a minimum precision level that is not “too big”, the agents are
still wishing to authorize access to their data at equilibrium.
Recall that S ⊆ N denotes the set of agents solicited by the
analyst (who are the players of the game Γ(S, η)) and that
s = |S| denotes its cardinal.
Theorem 2: If s = 1, then for any η ∈ [0, 1/σ2], Γ(S, η)
has a unique Nash equilibrium λ∗(s, η) = max {λ∗(1), η}.
If s > 1, then there exists a unique parameter η∗(s) ∈
[0, 1/σ2] s.t.:
(i) for any η ∈ [0, η∗(s)], Γ(S, η) has a unique Nash
equilibrium λ∗(s, η), s.t., λ∗i (s, η) = λ
∗(s, η) for each
i ∈ S, with
λ∗(s, η) =
{
λ∗(s) if 0 ≤ η ≤ λ∗(s)
η if λ∗(s) < η ≤ η∗(s); (8)
(ii) for any η ∈ (η∗(s), 1/σ2], there does not exist a Nash
equilibrium λ∗(s, η) s.t. λ∗i (s, η) 6= 0 for each i ∈ S.
Theorem 2 introduces the quantity η∗(s) which, as we will
see, is crucial for the analyst. Similarly to λ∗(s), the value of
η∗(s) cannot be written in closed form, but it can be computed
as the unique solution of the following fixed point problem:
η = g˜(s, η),
where function g˜ : N∗ × [0, 1/σ2] → [0,+∞] is defined for
each η ∈ (0, 1/σ2] and for each n ∈ N∗ as
g˜(s, η) = min
F
(
1
(s−1)η
)
− F
(
1
sη
)
c(η)
· η, 1/σ2

and is defined by continuity as limη→0+ g˜(s, η) in η = 0 for
each n ∈ N∗. We can also show that λ∗(s) < η∗(s) for all s
(we obtain this result inside the proof of Theorem 3).
Theorem 2 characterizes the Nash equilibrium for different
values of the parameter η. We observe that, as a consequence
of the symmetry of the game, when η ∈ [0, η∗(s)], the unique
equilibrium of Γ(S, η) is still symmetric, as it was for the
unique equilibrium of the original game Γ. More specifically,
if the analyst sets a minimum precision level η smaller than
the unique equilibrium precision level λ∗(s) of game Γ, the
restriction of the strategy set does not have any effect on the
outcome of the game. On the other hand, if the analyst sets
a minimum precision level η in the interval (λ∗(s), η∗(s)],
all agents are still willing to participate with a precision η >
λ∗(s). This result matches with intuition, because even though
agents’ marginal costs are higher than the marginal benefits
(the equilibrium choice is on the border of the strategy space
[η, 1/σ2]), their costs are still lower than if they choose a
precision level zero. Therefore, agents do not have incentives
to deviate. In the remaining range (η∗(s), 1/σ2], there does
not exist an equilibrium such that each agent chooses a non-
zero precision level. If there exist Nash equilibria, they are
such that a subset S′ ⊂ S of agents choose the non-zero
precision level λ∗(s′, η), while the others choose zero. The
possible existence of these equilibria is not relevant for our
analysis. In fact, such an equilibrium would provide the same
estimation that the analyst can obtain by implementing the
game Γ(S′, η) and, as we see in the following theorem, the
estimation improves by maximizing the number of agents in
the game.
The previous theorem is an important stepping stone allow-
ing us to establish the main result of this section:
Theorem 3: The estimation variance at equilibrium is min-
imal for S = N and η = η∗(n). Moreover, we have
σ2M (λ
∗(n, η∗(n))) < σ2M (λ
∗(n)),
that is, setting a minimum precision level η = η∗(n) strictly
improves the estimation.
Theorem 3 shows that the analyst can indeed improve the
quality of the estimation by setting a minimum precision
level. It establishes that it is optimal, for the analyst, to
solicit access to the private variable of all the agents whose
data is contained in the data repository; and it provides the
optimal minimum precision level η = η∗(n) that the analyst
should set to maximize the estimation precision. (Recall that
η∗(n) can be easily computed from the model’s parameters by
solving a fixed point problem.) Overall, Theorem 3 provides
an implementable mechanism through which the analyst can
improve the quality of the data provided by each user by
imposing restrictions on the variance that users can add. In
the next section, we study a special case with simple functions
F (·) and c(·) in order to quantify precisely the improvement
achieved.
C. The Special Case with Monomial Privacy Costs and Linear
Estimation Cost
In this section, we illustrate the results of the previous
sections on the special case where the privacy cost is monomial
and the estimation cost is linear; i.e., we assume that the cost
function in (4) has the form
Ji(λi,λ−i) = cλki + σ
2
M (λ), (9)
where c ∈ (0,∞) and k ≥ 2 are constants. Note that,
without loss of generality, in the linear estimation cost, we
omit the constant factor (adding a constant to the cost does
not modify the game solutions) as well as the slope factor
(adding it would give an equivalent game with constant c
rescaled). For this special case, we can determine both the
equilibrium precision (without a minimum precision level) and
the optimal minimum precision level in closed form. We can
then graphically depict how the quantities vary while moving
the model parameters, and explicitly compute the estimation
improvement. A preliminary analysis of the simplified model
with costs as in (9) was provided in our previous work [20]; we
provide an extended analysis of this special case here thanks
to the results of the previous section.
In the special case of costs given by (9), the equilibrium
precision chosen by the agents in the game Γ simplifies to:
λ∗(n) =

(
1
ckn2
) 1
k+1
if
(
1
ckn2
) 1
k+1
≤ 1/σ2
1/σ2 if
(
1
ckn2
) 1
k+1
> 1/σ2.
(10)
As we have seen in the previous section (Theorem 3), it is
optimal for the analyst to request access to the data of all
agents in N . In this special case, the corresponding optimal
minimum precision level becomes
η∗(n) =

(
1
cn(n− 1)
) 1
k+1
if
(
1
cn(n− 1)
) 1
k+1
≤ 1/σ2
1/σ2 if
(
1
cn(n− 1)
) 1
k+1
> 1/σ2.
Writing explicitly these two key quantities, we can imme-
diately notice that, when c increases, i.e., when the agents are
more concerned about privacy, they choose at equilibrium a
smaller precision level λ∗(n). Further, the minimum precision
level η∗(n) proposed by the analyst becomes smaller, if the
agents are more sensitive about the protection of their data. In
this special case, the properties of the results for the generic
case are easy to spot. For instance, we have λ∗(n) < η∗(n)
for each n ∈ N∗, and both of these quantities decrease and go
to zero when n increases and goes to +∞.
Most interestingly, the closed-form expressions that we have
for this special case allow us to analyze the rate of decrease
of the variance, and to quantify the improvement that can be
achieved by imposing a minimum precision level. For n large
enough (such that both λ∗(n) and η∗(n) are strictly smaller
than 1/σ2), the variance at equilibrium level λ∗(n) of game
Γ is given by
σ2M (λ
∗(n)) =
1
n
(
1
ckn2
) 1
k+1
,
k
1
k
+
1
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Fig. 1: Asymptotic improvement of the estimation choosing
the optimum precision level η∗ for values of k = 2, . . . , 10
and for values of k = 2, . . . , 500.
while the variance at equilibrium level λ∗(n, η∗(n)) of game
Γ(N, η∗(n))) where the optimal minimum precision level is
set is given by
σ2M (λ
∗(n, η∗(n))) =
1
n
(
1
cn(n−1)
) 1
k+1
.
Both appear to have the same rate of decrease in n
−k+1
k+1 which
is smaller than n−1 but becomes closer to n−1 as k tends
to infinity. Intuitively, as the privacy cost becomes closer to
a step function, the equilibrium precision level becomes less
dependent on the number of agents so that we get closer to
the case of averaging iid random variables of fixed variance.
Consequently, for n large enough, the improvement is given
by a factor:
σ2M (λ
∗(n))
σ2M (λ
∗(n, η∗(n)))
=
(
kn
n− 1
) 1
k+1
> 1, (11)
which asymptotically becomes constant:
σ2M (λ
∗(n))
σ2M (λ
∗(n, η∗(n)))
∼n→∞ k 1k+1 . (12)
Interestingly, we notice that this ratio of variances (charac-
terizing the improvement when setting the optimal minimum
precision level) depends on k, but not on c. (This holds even
before the asymptotic regime, as long as n is large enough such
that both λ∗(n) and η∗(n) are strictly smaller than 1/σ2.)
Figure 1 illustrates the asymptotic improvement ratio (12)
for different values of k. We observe that it is bounded, it
goes to 1 for large k’s and it is in the range of 25 − 30%
improvement for values of k around 2 − 10. Given that the
ratio (11) converges towards its asymptote from above, this
asymptotic improvement represents a lower bound of the
improvement the analyst can achieve by implementing our
mechanism with any finite number of agents n.
V. THE HETEROGENEOUS AGENT CASE
The previous section presents an exhaustive analysis of our
model in the homogeneous case, i.e., when the agents exhibit
the same privacy concerns. This simplified approach enables us
to derive a first set of concrete results, intuition and qualitative
understanding of the model and of the minimum contribution
level mechanism. The results directly apply to homogeneous
populations, and can serve as a first approximation by the
analyst in other cases, i.e., whenever she does not have specific
information about the agents. Indeed, the results are functions
only of the total number of agents, and in practice this could
represent the only available detail about the agents whose data
is stored in the data repository. However, not all populations
are homogeneous in their privacy concerns and having more
details about the different privacy concerns of the agents
allows for a customized analysis. Measuring how individuals
value their private information is non-trivial, but researchers
have conducted direct measurement surveys [57], [65] and
various laboratory/field experiments [58], [59] allowing for an
approximate ranking of users’ privacy concerns, and context-
specific valuations.
With this scope, we now extend our approach to the case
in which the analyst faces a heterogeneous population. In this
section, we remove the restricting hypothesis of homogeneity
of the agents, and we allow them to exhibit different privacy
concerns. Formally, the privacy cost function of an agent i ∈
N is equal to ci(·), where all the ci’s satisfy Assumption 1,
but may be different from each other.
In order to model this situation, we follow the same
approach that we used for the homogeneous case, i.e., we
first analyze the situation in which the analyst implements
the game Γ, without restricting the set of agents and without
introducing a minimum precision level. Thereafter, we show
how the analyst can improve the estimation by implementing
a modified game Γ(S, η).
A. The Estimation Game in the Heterogeneous Case
We start by analyzing the game Γ where each agent’s action
set is [0, 1/σ2]. As for the homogeneous case, also in the
heterogeneous case we know that the equilibrium of the game
Γ exists and is unique because we are considering a special
case of the game in [18]. However, we can now characterize
the equilibrium in more detail. The first result of the section,
is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Assume that the privacy costs satisfy c′1(λ) ≤
· · · ≤ c′n(λ), for all λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]. Then, game Γ has a unique
Nash equilibrium λ∗ s.t., 0 < λ∗n ≤ · · · ≤ λ∗1.
Theorem 4 assumes that the agents can be ordered in such
a way that, for any precision level λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2], an agent
choosing precision λ has higher marginal privacy cost (and
hence higher privacy cost since ci(0) = 0 for all agents) than
the previous agents if they choose the same precision level.
This may require some re-ordering from the initial ordering,
which comes without loss of generality. We believe that this
assumption will often be reasonable in practice since agents
who are more reluctant to increase the precision of their
revealed data from a small precision (i.e., have higher marginal
privacy cost for a small λ) will likely be more reluctant to
increase the precision of their revealed data from a large
precision (i.e., have higher marginal cost for a large λ too).
The proof of Theorem 4 exploits the potential nature of the
game to characterize the Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash
equilibrium, which cannot be written in closed form, can be
easily computed as the minimum of the (convex) potential
function of the game Γ, which is the function Φ : [0, 1/σ2]n →
R¯+, s.t., for each λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]n,
Φ(λ) =
∑
j∈N
cj(λj) + f(λ). (13)
We observe that, in the heterogeneous case, due to the
asymmetry of the model, we no longer have a symmetric
equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium strategy cannot be
written as a function of the total number of agents n, as
it depends on their privacy cost functions. We will use the
notation λ∗ = λ∗(N) to denote that the equilibrium depends
on the specific identity of the agents in the set of agents
N . As expected, at equilibrium, agents with higher privacy
concerns select lower precisions and, as for the homogeneous
case, no agent decides to deny the access to her data. The
fact that every agent contributes positively at Nash equilibrium
stems from our assumption that giving a small amount of data
implies very little cost since the marginal cost at zero is zero
(c′(0) = 0). (Note, though, that some agents may contribute
arbitrarily close to zero.) This assumption, although realistic, is
not strictly necessary; but it greatly simplifies the presentation
of our model and results.
Given the unique Nash equilibrium λ∗(N), the variance (3)
of the estimate of yM obtained by the analyst at equilibrium
is given by the following expression:
σ2M (λ
∗(N)) =
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (N)
. (14)
Even if the equilibrium precisions chosen by the agents (and
the corresponding variances) are not functions of only n, we
can still generalize Propositions 1 and 2 to the heterogeneous
case. In Propositions 3 and 4, we analyze how the equilibrium
precision and the variance of the estimate at equilibrium vary
when a new additional agent enters the game. Note that the
following two propositions do not use the ordering assumption
of Theorem 4.
Proposition 3: Given the game Γ, suppose that an ad-
ditional (n + 1)-th agent enters the game, and denote by
λ∗(N ∪ {n + 1}) the new equilibrium precision level. Then,
for each i ∈ N , λ∗i (N ∪ {n+ 1}) ≤ λ∗i (N).
Proposition 3 states that the equilibrium contribution of each
agent decreases, as soon as a new agent enters the game.
Proposition 4: Given the game Γ, suppose that an addi-
tional (n + 1)-th agent enters the game. Then, σ2M (λ
∗(N ∪
{n+ 1})) ≤ σ2M (λ∗(N)).
Proposition 4 shows that, for the analyst, it is always better
to let new agents enter the game despite the fact that, doing
so, each other agent is giving data with a lower precision.
Surprisingly, this is true even if the agent who enters has higher
privacy concerns than any other agent in the game, and then
would accordingly contribute the lowest quality data.
B. The Modified Estimation in the Heterogeneous Case
We now move to the case where the analyst can restrict
the set of agents by introducing a minimum precision level
η ∈ [0, 1/σ2]. Again, her final goal is to improve the
estimation accuracy. We consider at first the set of agents
S ⊆ N to be fixed, and we analyze how the estimation varies
while moving only the parameter η. This variant is modeled
by the game Γ(S, η) defined in Section III-D, where η is
now the only variable of the model. We denote by λ∗(S)
the equilibrium precision level for the game Γ(S, 0), and we
suppose that it is such that there exists at least one agent i ∈ S
s.t. λ∗i (S) 6= 1/σ2; otherwise the estimation is already optimal
with variance σ2/s for η = 0.
The next result extends Theorem 2 to the heterogeneous
case. We show that, if the analyst selects a minimum precision
level which is not “too high”, at equilibrium, all the agents
(even the most concerned about privacy) are still willing to
authorize access to their data (with perturbation).
Theorem 5: As in Theorem 4, assume that the privacy costs
satisfy c′1(λ) ≤ · · · ≤ c′n(λ), for each λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]. Given
the set of agents S ⊆ N , with cardinality s ≥ 1:
(i) if s = 1, then for any η ∈ [0, 1/σ2], Γ(S, η) has a unique
Nash equilibrium λ∗1(S, η) = max {λ∗1(S), η};
(ii) if s > 1, then there exists a parameter η∗(S) ∈
(λ∗(S), 1/σ2] such that, for any η ∈ [0, η∗(S)], Γ(S, η)
has a unique Nash equilibrium λ∗(S, η) with λ∗i (S, η) >
0 for all i ∈ S.
Theorem 5 introduces a parameter η∗(S) such that if the
analyst sets a minimum precision level in [0, η∗(S)], even the
most privacy-concerned of the agents in S does not have an
incentive to deviate to a zero precision level. As the theorem
is stated, η∗(S) is not unique (any value smaller than a valid
η∗(S) but still larger than λ∗(S) will be suitable). However,
let η∗(S) be s.t.
cn(λ
∗
n(S, η
∗(S))) = (15)
F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S, η
∗(S))
)
− F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S, η
∗(S))
)
,
where λ∗(S, η∗(S)) is the local minimum of the poten-
tial function Φ defined as in (13), but on the domain
[η∗(S), 1/σ2]s. We can prove that this η∗(S) is unique, that it
satisfies Theorem 5-(ii) and we conjecture that this definition
gives the largest possible parameter satisfying Theorem 5-(ii).
The result of Theorem 5 allows us to establish the main
result of this section:
Theorem 6: As in Theorem 4, assume that the privacy costs
satisfy c′1(λ) ≤ · · · ≤ c′n(λ), for each λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]. Let
η∗(N) be as in Theorem 5-(ii) for S = N . The analyst can im-
prove the estimation by implementing the game Γ(N, η∗(N))
with minimum precision level η∗(N), i.e.,
σ2M (λ
∗(N, η∗(N))) < σ2M (λ
∗(N)).
Theorem 6 shows that the analyst can improve the precision
of the estimation of the mean yM simply by setting a minimum
precision level and soliciting access to the data from all
the agents in N . This is true for any minimum precision
level η∗(N) such that Theorem 5-(ii) is satisfied and shows
that, even in the heterogeneous case, it is possible to strictly
improve the estimation by applying the minimum precision
level mechanism. Here too, however, we conjecture that the
parameter η∗(N) solving (15) yields the highest possible
improvement.
C. The Special Heterogeneous Case with Monomial Privacy
Costs and Linear Estimation Cost
As for the homogeneous case, we now illustrate the results
of the previous sections on the heterogeneous model in the
special case of monomial privacy cost and linear estimation
cost. In this simplified model, the cost function in (4) has the
form
Ji(λi,λ−i) = ciλki + σ
2
M (λ), (16)
with ci ∈ (0,∞) for each i ∈ N and k ≥ 2. The assumption
of Theorem 4 that agents can be ordered s.t. c′1(λ) ≤ ... ≤
c′n(λ) for each λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2], translates now to requiring that
0 < c1 ≤ ... ≤ cn (which, in the case of monomial costs, is
completely without loss of generality).
Even with such a simplified model, having heterogeneous
agents does not allow us to write the key quantity in closed
form as we did in the simplified homogeneous model in
Section IV-C. However, it is still possible to provide clearer
expressions and to quantify the variance improvement by
setting a minimum precision level.
When the agents play the estimation game Γ, at equilibrium
they choose a precision level that, if interior, can be written
as
λ∗i (N) =
 1
cik
(∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (N)
)2

1
k−1
.
The analyst can improve the estimation by setting a minimum
precision level η∗(N). In this simplified case, it takes the form
η∗(N) = 1
cn
(∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (η
∗(N))
)(∑
j∈N\{n} λ
∗
j (η
∗(N))
)
 1k−1 .
Note that the two expressions above are in the form of fixed-
point equations. It is interesting to note that when k > cn/c1
though, i.e., when the privacy cost of the agents are not too
dispersed, this minimum precision level can be written in
closed form as
η∗(N) =
(
1
cnn(n− 1)
) 1
k+1
. (17)
It is then equal to the optimal precision level, when all
the agents have the same privacy cost as the most privacy-
concerned individual.
Figure 2 illustrates on an example the estimation improve-
ment in the heterogeneous case when choosing η∗(N) as
above (which we conjectured is the optimal choice). We com-
pare it with the improvement in the analogous homogeneous
case when choosing the optimal η∗(n) (see Theorem 3 which
does not depend on c).
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Fig. 2: Improvement of the estimation in Γ(η) in the hetero-
geneous case choosing the optimum precision level η∗(N),
compared to the homogeneous case choosing the optimum
precision level η∗(n); for values of k = 2, . . . , 20. In this
example, c = (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3), 1/σ2 = 2.
VI. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL
In this section, we extend our model in two directions.
In Section VI-A, we propose an alternative modified esti-
mation game, and we compare it with the one proposed in
Section III-D. The main difference with the previous one is
that it is a two-stage game. In Section VI-B, we add an
important variable to our model by introducing a per-agent
cost of collecting data. Both proposed extensions are included
to derive qualitative insights about the practical applicability
of the model, however, we defer an in-depth analysis to future
work.
A. The Modified Two-Stage Game
In Γ(N, η), both the decision to authorize the access (or
to deny it) and the selection of a precision level (in case of
authorization) are simultaneous. This variant captures cases
in a realistic fashion where the analyst requests access to
data already present in a repository. In different applications,
however, the analyst may first recruit participants that commit
to provide private data with a minimum precision; and only in
a second stage (for example, as soon as the data becomes
available), these agents would be asked to disclose their
information. This scenario applies, for example, to medical
research studies or consumer decisions, and it motivates the
study of a model where agents first decide to participate or not,
and only then decide on the precision of the data released.
Another motivation to study such a model is that it could
lead to a higher estimation accuracy, in which case the analyst
would want to implement it even if it does not naturally arise
from the application at stake.
In this section, we investigate this extension of our original
model in the simplified case with homogeneous monomial
privacy costs and linear estimation cost as it is sufficient to
understand and illustrate the qualitative differences between
the two models. We leave the development of the more general
model to future work. We also point out the possibility, for
future work, of a similar extension, in which the agents
asynchronously make decisions on whether or not to share
their data (i.e., they make their sharing decisions based on
actions taken by agents who were contacted earlier by the
analyst). However, in absence of observability of the contri-
bution decisions (as it is often the case in the medical domain
due to confidentiality restrictions) even asynchronous decision-
making can be approximated well with a simultaneous move
model.
To investigate our variant of the model and to compare
its outcome with the one of the game Γ(N, η), we define
a two-stage variant of the game. We assume that the agents
are initially informed of the minimum precision level η. In a
first stage, they have to decide if they want to deny access
to their data, and exit the game, or if they wish to accept to
authorize access. The set of agents who accepted to participate
is revealed to all agents. In a second stage, the agents who
decided to participate choose their precision in the imposed
range [η, 1/σ2]. Formally, this situation is modeled through
the following two-stage game Γ2(η):
(i) In the first stage, the agents make a binary choice pi ∈
{0, 1}
∀i ∈ N pi =
{
0 if i denies the access
1 if i accepts to authorize.
We denote by p ∈ {0, 1}n a strategy profile, P = {i ∈
N : pi = 1} the set of agents who accept, and p = |P |
its cardinality.
(ii) In the second stage, given p ∈ {0, 1}n, the agents play
a game ΓP (η) =
〈
N, [η, 1/σ2]p × {0}n−p, (Ji)i∈N
〉
,
where each agent i ∈ P has strategy space [η, 1/σ2]
whereas each agent i ∈ N \ P has strategy space {0}
(i.e., the agents in N \P can only choose λi = 0, which,
we reiterate, is equivalent to no participation).
We have already seen that the analyst can improve the esti-
mation by modifying the original game, and that the optimal
choice, in that previous setting (in the homogeneous case),
is to implement the game Γ(N, η∗(n)). We now investigate
whether the analyst can improve the estimation even more,
while implementing the game Γ2(η) for an optimal choice of
the minimum precision level η.
The games Γ(N, η) and Γ2(η) differ in the information
available to agents when choosing their precision (observe for
instance that Γ(N, 0) = Γ, while Γ2(0) 6= Γ). In Γ(N, η),
both the decision to authorize the access or to deny it and
the decision of the precision (in case of authorization) are
simultaneous. In contrast, in Γ2(η), the set of agents who will
authorize with precision of at least η is known at the time of
choosing the exact precision.
As we did for the previous games, we study Γ2(η) as
a complete information game between the agents, i.e., we
assume that the set of agents, the action sets (in particular,
when present, the value of the parameter η) and the costs are
known by all the agents.
We study the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game
using backward induction. Given p ∈ {0, 1}n the outcome
of the first stage, a Nash equilibrium for the second stage
is a strategy profile λ∗ ∈ [η, 1/σ2]p × {0}n−p s.t., for each
i ∈ N \ P , λ∗i = 0, while for each i ∈ P , λ∗i is s.t.
λ∗i ∈ arg min
λi∈[η,1/σ2]
Ji(λi,λ
∗
−i). (18)
If for each p ∈ {0, 1}n the second stage game has a unique
solution λ∗(p, η) (as we will see, it is the case in our model),
the choice that the agents make in the first stage determines
univocally the outcome of the two-stage game. Then, Γ2(η)
reduces to a one-stage game
〈
N, {0, 1}n, (J1i )i∈N
〉
, where the
cost function J1i : {0, 1}n → R¯, for each p ∈ {0, 1}, is given
for all i ∈ N by
J1i (p) = Ji(λ
∗(p, η)) = cλ∗i (p, η)
k + σ2M (λ
∗(p, η)). (19)
Then, an equilibrium of the game Γ2(η) is a strategy profile
p∗ ∈ {0, 1} s.t.
p∗i ∈ arg min
pi∈{0,1}
J1i (pi,p
∗
−i), ∀i ∈ N. (20)
We apply backward induction, by starting to analyze the
second stage game. In the following lemma, we show the
existence and the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the
game ΓP (η) when p 6= (0, . . . , 0).
Lemma 1: For each p ∈ {0, 1}n \ {(0, . . . , 0)}, the
game ΓP (η) has a unique Nash equilibrium λ∗(p, η), s.t.,
λ∗i (p, η) = λ
∗(p, η) for each i ∈ P , with
λ∗(p, η) =
{
λ∗(p) if 0 ≤ η ≤ λ∗(p)
η if λ∗(p) < η ≤ 1/σ2, (21)
(where λ∗(p) is defined as in (10)) and λ∗i (p, η) = 0, for each
i ∈ N \ P .
We observe again that the equilibrium of the game restricted
to agents in P is symmetric (i.e., each participating agent
chooses the same precision level at equilibrium). We call
λ∗(p, η) the equilibrium precision for agents in P to empha-
size the dependence on the cardinality p of the set P and on the
parameter η. In fact, due to the symmetry, the optimal choice
for an agent who decided to participate depends only on the
number of agents who made the same choice as her in the first
stage and not on the identity of these agents. Further, given P
and η, the equilibrium of ΓP (η) is the same as the equilibrium
of Γ(N, η) given in Theorem 2, when replacing n by p. The
only difference is that, even for large η the agents in P will
choose precision level η in ΓP (η) since they are committed
to participate with precision of at least η. Consequently, the
equilibrium of ΓP (η) always exists and it is s.t. each agent
choosing a non-zero precision level.
As the second stage game has always a unique solution, we
can apply backward induction, and the two-stage game Γ2(η)
reduces to a one-stage game. The following lemma establishes
the existence and uniqueness of its equilibrium for a minimum
precision level.
Lemma 2: For any η ∈ [λ∗(n − 1), η∗(n)], the two-
stage game Γ2(η) has a unique equilibrium given by p∗ =
(1, . . . , 1).
Lemma 2 states that, if the analyst chooses a minimum pre-
cision level in the range [λ∗(n−1), η∗(n)] and implements the
two-stage game Γ2(η), then each agent will participate at equi-
librium. The equilibrium contributions, given by Lemma 1,
equal η for each agent since η ≥ λ∗(n − 1) ≥ λ∗(n). For
η in the range [λ∗(n − 1), η∗(n)], the outcome of the two-
stage game Γ2(η) is therefore the same as for the one-stage
game Γ(N, η). This is not the case, however, for other ranges
of parameters. In particular, for η < λ∗(n − 1), all agents
participate in Γ(N, η) whereas they may not participate in
Γ2(η). This is because, in Γ2(η), agents react in the second
stage to the participation decisions of the first stage (typically
if an agent chooses not to participate, the others increase their
precisions in the second stage). As a consequence, agents
can strategically choose their participation in the first stage to
influence the precisions chosen in the second stage. Analysis
of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in
Γ2(η) in ranges of η outside [λ∗(n − 1), η∗(n)] is therefore
more intricate. Nevertheless, we can establish our main result,
namely that choosing η = η∗(n) yields an optimal estimation
variance for the analyst:
Theorem 7: For the game Γ2(η), with η ∈ [0, 1/σ2], the es-
timate’s variance at equilibrium σ2M (λ
∗(p∗, η)) is minimized
for η = η∗(n). The improvement obtained by setting the
minimum precision level η = η∗(n) is characterized, for n
large enough, by the ratio
σ2M (λ
∗(n))
σ2M (λ
∗(p∗, η∗(n)))
=
(
kn
n− 1
) 1
k+1
> 1, (k ≥ 2).
Theorem 7 shows that the optimal η is the same for the
one-stage game Γ(N, η) and the two-stage game Γ2(η), and
both yield the same improvement for the analyst. As such,
the discussion given in Section IV-B about the asymptotic
behavior of this gain still holds. However, as mentioned, the
two games Γ(η) and Γ2(η) are not equivalent for each choice
of the parameter η. In particular, we can infer from the proof
of Theorem 7 that there is still a range of minimum precision
levels for which the estimation is strictly improved, but this
range is smaller than it was for Γ(N, η).
B. The Estimation Game in the Presence of Per-Agent Costs
In this section, we propose an extension of our model to
include the cost of collecting data. Indeed, in Section III and
throughout this paper, we assumed that data is collected at no
cost, and that the analyst aims at minimizing the variance of
the mean estimation. The absence of per-agent cost (to solicit
contributions) is a standard assumption in most of the public
good literature. However, it could limit the appeal of our model
in some applications. Here, we present preliminary results
with arbitrary per-agent cost, restricted to the homogeneous
case. We then introduce a simplified case with linear per-
agent cost, to illustrate the qualitative difference to the zero
per-agent cost case, in particular, the existence of an optimal
number of agents n. The derivation of the optimal n would
be slightly different when assuming, for example, a concave
cost function. This is left as a possible future work suggestion
(see Section VII).
When facing a per-agent cost, we can no longer rely on
the fact that the analyst will always prefer to have the largest
possible set of agents. Rather, she has to select the optimal
subset of agents to include in the game. In the homogeneous
case, selecting the optimal subset of agents reduces to selecting
the optimal number of agents n∗ ∈ N . To address this
problem, we assume that, instead of aiming at minimizing
the variance, the analyst aims at minimizing a cost function
JA : N∗ → R defined as
JA(n) = f(η
∗(n)) + Cn, (22)
where f is the estimation cost defined in Section III, while C
represents the per-agent cost of collecting personal data. We
assume that the estimation cost is evaluated at equilibrium,
when the analyst chooses the optimal minimum precision
level. In fact, for a fixed n, η∗(n) provides the minimum
variance and, consequently, the minimum estimation cost. The
problem of the analyst now reduces to setting an optimal
number of agents n∗.
Theorem 8: The function JA(n) has a minimum in N∗. The
optimal n∗ is given by n∗ = max{m ∈ N∗|c(η∗(m)) ≥ C},
if this set is non-empty, and by 1 otherwise.
Theorem 8 shows how the analyst can optimize the balance
between the minimization of the estimation cost and the per-
agent recruitment cost. In this situation, it is typically not
optimal anymore to contact as many agents as possible. Of
course, if the theoretically determined optimal number of
agents equals or exceeds the size of the potential participant
pool (n∗ ≥ n), then the analyst will contact all available
agents. As c(η∗(m)) is non-increasing in m, n∗ can be easily
computed by the analyst, for example by implementing a
bisection method on [1, n], where n is the total number of
agents whose data is contained in the repository.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigate the problem of estimating
population averages from data provided by privacy-sensitive
users. We assume that users can perturb their data before
revealing it (e.g., by adding zero-mean noise) in order to
protect their privacy. Users, however, benefit from a more
accurate population estimate. Therefore, each user strategically
selects the precision of her revealed data to balance her
privacy cost and the cost incurred by a lower precision of
the population estimate. We find that the resulting game has
a unique Nash equilibrium and carefully study its properties.
We further prove that the analyst can increase the population
estimate’s accuracy simply by imposing a minimum precision
level for the data which users can reveal (e.g., by restricting
the variance of the noise users can add). The surprising and
important aspect of this result is that the scheme remains
incentive-compatible, i.e., users are willing to provide data
with a higher precision rather than dropping out. We also show
how to tune the minimum precision level the analyst should
set in order to optimize the population estimate’s accuracy. In
our numerical simulations, the maximum improvement of the
population estimate’s accuracy is in the order of 20− 40%.
Our model treats the population estimate’s accuracy as a
public good (e.g., if one agent increases the precision of
the data she gives, it benefits all users). Then, our results
offer a novel method to increase the provision of a public
good above voluntary contributions, simply by restricting the
agents’ strategy spaces. This method is attractive through its
simplicity compared for instance to other schemes that involve
monetary transfers, and could find application in other public
good problem domains.
The results are derived for arbitrary functions for the privacy
cost experienced by each user and for the estimation cost
(satisfying relatively mild assumptions). This increases the
robustness of our main results and allows for application to
various situations. Further, we study the cases of homogeneous
and heterogeneous agents. Indeed, for practical utilization of
our work it is important to be able to accommodate different
types of privacy preferences as evidenced by the literature
on the value of privacy (which includes direct measurement
surveys [57], [65] and laboratory/field experiments [58], [59]).
We also consider extensions of our basic model such as
variations in the structure of decision-making. Introducing
a two-stage structure impacts the available information to
individuals, i.e., whether or not the set of contributing agents
is determined before agents choose their precision levels.
Surprisingly, we find that providing this information to users
can never improve the estimation’s accuracy. In future work,
we plan to analyze other decision-making structures, such as
when agents make decisions asynchronously and can utilize
information about the previous contribution levels by other
agents.
In our basic model, we assume that the analyst can collect
data from n users at negligible cost. This assumption can be
reasonable in scenarios where the data is already available
in a repository, and the analyst merely has to inquire with
individuals to contribute their data for secondary analysis.
In this scenario, we showed that the population estimate’s
accuracy increases with n (although each individual then
lowers the precision of her contribution). We further extend
the model to handle applications where there could be a more
substantial cost of collecting data per user (e.g., cost of sending
a survey). In that case, it is no longer optimal for the analyst to
collect data from all users but we show, in the homogeneous
case, how the analyst can then select the optimal number of
users. The method outlined for the homogeneous case also
provides a trajectory to approach the task of selecting the
optimal set of agents to solicit data from in the heterogeneous
case, utilizing the ordering assumption of Theorem 4. Further,
our results regarding the benefits of a minimum precision level
apply also to costly data acquisition. In future work, we will
consider non-linear cost (e.g., concave) to further generalize
our results.
A unique Nash equilibrium exists for all considered cases
and extensions. Computing the exact equilibrium strategies
may be non-trivial for agents in practice. However, knowledge
about the uniqueness of the optimal strategies suggests the pos-
sibility of reaching the equilibrium via tacit coordination when
agents gain experience with comparable data contribution
decisions [66]. In addition, providing a minimum precision
level will further guide agents in their decision-making.
In this paper, we consider the problem of estimating the
population average of a single scalar quantity. However, the
results also serve as building blocks to tackle more complex
scenarios. For example, an analyst may need to estimate
averages of several quantities which are not independent
(if the quantities are independent, our results readily apply
by considering several independent instances of the model,
possibly with different privacy costs). Further, the analyst may
want to estimate the parameter of a linear model as in [18]. In
both cases, the problem of selecting the users to solicit data
from will become combinatorial and requires further study
to find a suitable approximation. However, our techniques to
characterize the equilibrium of the modified game will extend
and will be instrumental in establishing the optimal strategy
space to impose for a given set of users.
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APPENDIX
A. Corollary 1 from “Comparing Equilibria” of Milgrom and
Roberts [67]
Many of our theoretical contributions rely on a result of the
paper from Milgrom and Roberts, “Comparing Equilibria”. To
help the reader, we present here this result. For simplicity, we
replace the hypothesis of “continuous but for upward jumps”,
with the stronger hypothesis of “continuous”, which is verified
by our functions to which we apply the theorem. We also adapt
the statement of the corollary to a fixed point problem defined
on a generic interval [a, b] ⊂ R+.
Corollary 1 (Milgrom and Roberts): Let g(x, t) : [a, b] ×
T → [a, b], where T is any partially ordered set. Suppose
that for all t ∈ T , g is continuous in x. Then xL(t) =
inf{x|g(x, t) ≤ x} and xH(t) = sup{x|g(x, t) ≥ x} are the
extreme fixed points of g, that is, the lowest and the highest
solutions of the equation g(x, t) = x. If, in addition, g is
monotone non-decreasing in t for all x ∈ [0, 1], then the
functions xL(·) and xH(·) are monotone non-decreasing, and
if g is strictly increasing in t, then these functions are strictly
increasing.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Γ is a symmetric potential game, with potential function
Φ : [0, 1/σ2]n → R¯, s.t., for each λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]n
Φ(λ) =
∑
j∈N
c(λj) + f(λ). (23)
By the definition of potential game, the set of Nash equi-
libria of Γ is contained in the set of local minima of func-
tion Φ. Then, as function Φ has a unique local minimum
λ∗ ∈ [0, 1/σ2]n, it has to coincide with the unique Nash
equilibrium of Γ. In particular, the optimum λ∗ is such that
λ∗ 6= (0, . . . , 0) and for each i ∈ N , λ∗i satisfies the following
KKT conditions −
1
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j )
2
F ′
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j
)
+ c′(λ∗i )− ψ∗i + φ∗i = 0
ψ∗i λ
∗
i = 0 φ
∗
i (λ
∗
i − 1/σ2) = 0, ψ∗i , φ∗i ≥ 0.
(24)
Observe that, as a consequence of the assumption that c′(0) =
0, λ∗i > 0 for each i ∈ N . In fact, if we suppose there exists
i ∈ N s.t. λ∗i = 0, the ith-equation of the KKT conditions
cannot be satisfied, as
− 1
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j )
2
F ′
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j
)
− ψ∗i < 0,
because ψ∗i > 0 and F
′ > 0 as F is strictly convex. Moreover,
as Φ is a symmetric function on a symmetric domain, the only
minimum is symmetric, i.e., λ∗i = λ
∗ for each i ∈ N .
C. Proof of Proposition 1
From (24), λ∗ is the unique solution of the following fixed
point problem
λ = g(n, λ), (25)
where function g : N+ × [0, 1/σ2] → [0,+∞] is defined for
each λ ∈ (0, 1/σ2] and for each n ∈ N+ as
g(n, λ) = min
{√
F ′
(
1
nλ
)
1
n2c′(λ)
, 1/σ2
}
(26)
and by continuity as limλ→0+ g(n, λ) in λ = 0 for each n ∈
N+.
We consider this fixed point problem, but with the parameter
n defined on the real interval [1,+∞]. For each n ∈ [1,+∞],
g is continuous in λ. Function g is monotonic non-increasing
in n. In fact,
∂g
∂n
=
1
2
√
F ′
(
1
nλ
)
1
n2c′(λ)[
− 1
n4λ2c′(λ)
F ′′
(
1
nλ
)
− 2nc
′(λ)
n4c′(λ)2
F ′
(
1
nλ
)]
< 0
Applying Corollary 1 of Milgrom and Roberts [67], recalled
in Appendix A, (with parameter t = −n) the unique fixed
point λ∗(n) is non-increasing in n, and this proves (i).
To prove (ii), we observe that
lim
n→+∞ g(n, λ) = 0 (zero function),
and the unique fixed point of the zero function is 0.
D. Proof of Proposition 2
If λ∗(n) = 1/σ2 or λ∗(n+1) = 1/σ2, (i) is trivial. Suppose
that both λ∗(n) 6= 1/σ2 and λ∗(n + 1) 6= 1/σ2. Moreover,
suppose by contradiction that
1
nλ∗(n)
<
1
(n+ 1)λ∗(n+ 1)
. (27)
It follows that
F ′
(
1
nλ∗(n)
)
< F ′
(
1
(n+ 1)λ∗(n+ 1)
)
(28)
because of the strict convexity of F . Moreover, as λ∗(n) >
λ∗(n+ 1) (by Corollary 1), it follows that
c′(λ∗(n)) > c′(λ∗(n+ 1)) (29)
because of the strict convexity of c. From (28) and (29), it
follows that
1
nλ∗(n)
=
1
n
√
F ′
(
1
nλ∗(n)
)
1
n2c′(λ∗(n))
>
1
(n+ 1)
√
F ′
(
1
(n+1)λ∗(n+1)
)
1
(n+1)2c′(λ∗(n+1))
=
1
(n+ 1)λ∗(n+ 1)
,
which contradicts (27) and then proves (i).
To prove (ii), observe that, because of Proposition 1-(ii) and
because of Assumption 1,
lim
n→+∞ c
′(λ∗(n)) = 0.
If, by contradiction,
lim
n→+∞
1
nλ∗(n)
> 0, (30)
then
lim
n→+∞F
′
(
1
nλ∗(n)
)
> 0,
because of the strict convexity of F , and consequently
lim
n→+∞
1
n
√
F ′
(
1
nλ∗(n)
)
1
n2c′(λ∗(n))
= 0,
which contradicts (30) and then proves (ii)
E. Proof of Theorem 2
First, observe that for each S ⊆ N , with s ≥ 1, and for each
η ∈ [0, 1/σ2], the game Γ(S, η) is still a potential game, with
potential function Φ as in (23), but defined on the domain[{0} ∪ [η, 1/σ2]]s. The set of Nash equilibria of Γ(S, η) is
included in the set of the local minima of Φ on this new
domain.
When s = 1, the potential function and the cost function
of the only agent coincide. Then, a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is a global minimum of Φ. If
η ≤ λ∗(1), then the only global minimum of Φ is still λ∗(1).
If η > λ∗(1), then the only global minimum is η.
Now, let s > 1. We define the function g˜ : N+×[0, 1/σ2]→
[0,+∞] s.t., for each η ∈ (0, 1/σ2] and for each n ∈ N+
g˜(s, η) = min
F
(
1
(s−1)η
)
− F
(
1
sη
)
c(η)
· η, 1/σ2
 (31)
and we extend it by continuity in η = 0 for each n ∈ N+. We
consider the following fixed point problem
η = g˜(s, η), (32)
and we show that this fixed point problem has a unique
solution. To prove that, we show first that equation
F
(
1
(s− 1)η
)
− F
(
1
sη
)
= c(η) (33)
in the η variable, has at most one solution in [0, 1/σ2]. This
can be seen by noticing that, for each s > 1, the difference
1
(s−1)η− 1sη is decreasing in η. Moreover, function F is strictly
convex and non-increasing in η, and this implies that the
difference
F
(
1
(s− 1)η
)
− F
(
1
sη
)
(34)
is a decreasing function of η. As c is a non-decreasing function
of η, it follows that (33) has at most one solution in the given
interval.
The fixed point of (32) is given by this solution (if it exists),
or by 1/σ2 otherwise, and then it is unique. We denote this
unique fixed point by η∗(s).
Looking for the Nash equilibria when s > 1, at first we
focus on the ones which are in [η, 1/σ2]s. In particular, we
can distinguish the three following subcases (observe that, in
case we have that λ∗(s) > η∗(s), this simply implies that the
subcase (iib) will never occur):
(ia) When η ∈ [0, λ∗(s)], as λ∗(s) is the unique local mini-
mum of the potential function on the domain [0, 1/σ2]s
and as λ∗(s) ∈ [η, 1/σ2]s, then, because of the convexity,
it is still the only local minimum of the potential function
on [η, 1/σ2]s. In particular, it is a Nash equilibrium of
Γ(S, η). In fact, if there exists a deviation of agent i ∈ S
for the game Γ(S, η) which makes her cost function
smaller, it would be a feasible deviation which makes
her function smaller also for the game Γ(S, 0), and this
would contradict the fact that λ∗(s) is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ(S, 0).
(ib) When η ∈ (λ∗(s), η∗(s)], the vector η = (η)i∈S is
the only local minimum of the potential function on
[η, 1/σ2]s. In particular, it is a Nash equilibrium. In fact,
because of the strictly convexity of the potential function,
any deviation of agent i ∈ N to a precision level in
(η, 1/σ2] would make her cost function bigger. Moreover,
if agent i ∈ N deviates to 0, her cost function cannot
become smaller. In fact, we have that, from (33), when
η ≤ η∗(s),
F
(
1
(s− 1)η
)
≥ F
(
1
sη
)
+ c(η).
The term on the left represents the cost of agent i
deviating to zero, and the term on the right denotes the
cost when she decides to keep on choosing a precision
equal to η.
(ii) When η ∈ (η∗(s), 1/σ2], the only local minimum in
[η, 1/σ2]s is η. But this is not a Nash equilibrium. In
fact, still because of (33), when η > η∗(s)
F
(
1
(s− 1)η
)
< F
(
1
sη
)
+ c(η),
and this means that an agent can make her cost function
smaller deviating to zero.
We can now remark that, as λ∗(s) is a Nash equilibrium for
Γ(S, 0), it implies that, by playing that strategy, the agents
do not have incentives to deviate to zero. As η∗(s) is the
maximum minimum precision level s.t., if the agents are
playing Γ(S, η∗(s)), they do not have incentives to deviate
by η∗(s), it follows that λ∗(s) ≤ η∗(s).
We proved that when η ∈ (η∗(s), 1/σ2], there does not exist
a Nash equilibrium of Γ(S, η) in [η, 1/σ2]s, and this proves
Theorem 2-(ii). We have also proved that when η ∈ [0, η∗(s)],
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of Γ(S, η) in [η, 1/σ2]s.
In order to prove that there do not exist other equilibria with
a zero component (and then, in order to prove Theorem 2-(i)),
we first state the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Suppose that λ′ = (λ′1, . . . , λ
′
s) is a local mini-
mum of the potential function Φ on
[{0} ∪ [η, 1/σ2]]s, with
η ∈ [0, 1/σ2] and call T = {i ∈ S : λ′i = 0}, with t = |T |.
Then, λ′ is a local minimum on {0}t × [η, 1/σ2]s−t and it is
s.t. λ′i = λ
′ for each i ∈ S \ T , with
λ′ =
{
λ∗(s− t) if 0 ≤ η ≤ λ∗(s− t)
η if λ∗(s− t) < η ≤ 1/σ2. (35)
Suppose now that there exists a local minimum λ′ s.t. λ′i =
0 for at least one i ∈ S and call T = {i ∈ S : λ′i = 0}, with
t = |T | ≥ 1, the set of agents who are at a zero precision
level. Then, because of Lemma 3, λ′i = λ
′ for each i ∈ S \ T
and it is given by (35). We show that this cannot be a Nash
equilibrium. In fact, we have that,
c(λ′) ≤ F
(
1
(s− 1)λ′
)
− F
(
1
sλ′
)
(36)
< F
(
1
(s− t)λ′
)
− F
(
1
(s− t+ 1)λ′
)
,
when t ≥ 1. The first inequality follows from (33) and from
the fact that λ′ ∈ [0, η∗(s)]. The second inequality follows
from the fact that, fixed η, the difference in (34) is a decreasing
function also of s. From (36), it follows that if an agent in S\T
deviates moving from the precision level η to the precision
level λ′, she can strictly decrease her cost function.
This proves that any local minimum of Φ s.t. at least
one agent chooses a zero precision level, cannot be a Nash
equilibrium. Then, when s > 1, the equilibrium is unique and
it is given by (8), with η∗(s) unique solution of (32).
F. Proof of Theorem 3
We have already seen in the proof of Theorem 2, that for
each S ⊆ N , λ∗(s) ≤ η∗(s). It follows that σ2M (η∗(s)) ≤
σ2M (λ
∗(s)). This means that, fixed the number of agents s,
it is optimal, for the analyst, to choose a minimum precision
level equal to η∗(s).
Step 1: First, we show now that, if λ∗(s) 6= 1/σ2, this
inequality is strict, meaning that λ∗(s) < η∗(s) and the analyst
can strictly improve the estimation, by choosing η∗(s) instead
of 0 as minimum precision level. In fact, if λ∗(s) = η∗(s), it
follows that λ∗(s) is s.t.
c(λ∗(s)) = F
(
1
(s− 1)λ∗(s)
)
− F
(
1
sλ∗(s)
)
.
But then, at equilibrium, the potential function Φ is s.t.
F
(
1
sλ∗(s)
)
+ sc(λ∗(s))
= F
(
1
sλ∗(s)
)
+ (s− 1)c(λ∗(s))
+ F
(
1
(s− 1)λ∗(s)
)
− F
(
1
sλ∗(s)
)
= F
(
1
(s− 1)λ∗(s)
)
+ (s− 1)c(λ∗(s)).
This implies that the potential function is minimal for an
agent i choosing λ∗i (S) = 0, and this contradicts the fact
that the equilibrium of Φ is unique, symmetric and s.t. λ∗ 6=
(0, . . . , 0). It follows that, for each S ⊆ N , λ∗(s) < η∗(s).
Step 2: Second, we observe that η∗(s) is nonincreasing in
s. This because η∗(s) is the unique fixed point of the problem
in (32), and the function g˜(s, η) is continuous, nondecreasing
in η and nonincreasing in s. Then, applying Corollary 1 of
Milgrom and Roberts [67], recalled in Appendix A, to it (with
parameter t = −s), we have the result.
Step 3: Finally, we show that σ2M (η∗(s)) is nonincreasing
in s, and then, that it is optimal, for the analyst, to collect
data from the largest possible number of agents. We suppose,
by contradiction, that there exists k ∈ N+ s.t. σ2M (η∗(k)) <
σ2M (η
∗(k+1)), or equivalently s.t. k ·η∗(k) > (k+1) ·η∗(k+
1). We have shown in step 2 that η∗(s) is nonincreasing in s,
then η∗(k) ≥ η∗(k + 1). Suppose η∗(k) 6= 1/σ2 (otherwise,
the result is trivial). By definition, η∗(k) is the solution of (32)
for s = k and η∗(k+ 1) for s = k+ 1. We write the equation
in (32) as
F
(
1
t1 − η∗(k)
)
− F
(
1
t1
)
= c(η∗(k)) (37)
where t1 = k · η∗(k). Similarly, we write
F
(
1
t0 − η∗(k + 1)
)
− F
(
1
t0
)
= c(η∗(k + 1))
where t0 = (k + 1) · η∗(k + 1). Because of the hypothesis
by contradiction, t0 < t1; moreover the difference on the left
in (37) is increasing as a function of the parameter. We may
apply a straightforward adaptation of Milgrom and Roberts’
Corollary 1 [67], recalled in Appendix A, (on the right we do
not have a linear function of η as in the original statement,
but a strictly increasing function of η) and we obtain that
η∗(k) < η∗(k + 1), contradicting what we have shown in
Step 2.
We have shown that for the analyst it is not optimal to
implement the game with only a subset of the agents. More-
over, for the analyst it is not optimal to choose a minimum
precision level η > η∗(n). In fact, in that case, as we have
seen in Section IV-B, if there exists an equilibrium, it is an
equilibrium s.t. only a subset of agents choose a non-zero
precision level, and this leads back to the previous case.
G. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof follows the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, the
unique Nash equilibrium satisfies the KKT conditions in (24)
(with heterogenous privacy costs), from which it still follows
that, because of the assumption that c′i(0) = 0 for each i ∈ N ,
λ∗i 6= 0 for each i ∈ N . Given i ∈ N , the corresponding
equilibrium precision level is s.t.
c′i(λ
∗
i ) =
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗))
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j )
2
, (38)
if the solution is smaller than or equal to 1/σ2, or by 1/σ2
otherwise.
As the right term is the same for each i ∈ N , it immediately
follows that, if the ci’s are s.t. c′1(λ) ≤ ... ≤ c′n(λ), for each
λ ∈ [0, 1/σ2], then λ∗n ≤ . . . ≤ λ∗1.
H. Proof of Proposition 3
From Equation (38), as soon as agent n+1 enters the game,
fixing the strategies of the other agents, the term on the right
decreases. In order to balance the equality at best response,
and because of the convexity of the privacy cost ci, fixing the
strategy of the other agents, each agent i ∈ N will choose
a precision level which is smaller then the precision level
at best response, without agent n + 1. As a consequence, at
equilibrium, λ∗i (N ∪ {n+ 1}) ≤ λ∗i (N) for each i ∈ N .
I. Proof of Proposition 4
We write Equation (38) as
c′i(λ
∗
i )
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗))
= σ2M (λ
∗).
We suppose by contradiction that σ2M (λ
∗(N ∪ {n +
1})) > σ2M (λ∗(N)). Then, F ′(σ2M (λ∗(N ∪ {n + 1}))) >
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗(N))), because of the convexity of F . Moreover,
from Proposition 3, we know that λ∗i (N ∪{n+ 1}) ≤ λ∗i (N),
and then c′(λ∗i (N ∪ {n + 1})) ≤ c′(λ∗i (N)) because of the
convexity of the cis. It follows that
σ2M (λ
∗(N ∪ {n+ 1}))
=
c′i(λ
∗
i (N ∪ {n+ 1})
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗(N ∪ {n+ 1})))
<
c′i(λ
∗
i (N)
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗(N)))
= σ2M (λ
∗(N)),
and this contradicts the supposition by contradiction.
J. Proof of Theorem 5
At first, we recall that we denote by λ∗(S) the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ(S, 0). Then, for each S ⊆ N , with
s ≥ 1, and for each η ∈ [0, 1/σ2], we observe that the game
Γ(S, η) is still a potential game, with potential function Φ as
in (23), but defined on the domain
[{0}∪ [η, 1/σ2]]s. The set
of Nash equilibria of Γ(S, η) is included in the set of the local
minima of Φ on this new domain.
When s = 1, the potential function and the cost function
of the only agent coincide. Then, a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is a global minimum of Φ. If
η ≤ λ∗({1}), then the only global minimum of Φ is still
λ∗({1}). If η > λ∗({1}), then the only global minimum is η.
Now, let s > 1. By definition of Nash equilibrium, the
unique NE λ∗(S) is s.t.
cn(λ
∗
n(S)) ≤ F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S)
)
−F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S)
)
,
which translates the fact that agent s does not have incentives
to deviate to zero.
Step 1: First, we show that
cn(λ
∗
n(S)) < F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S)
)
−F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S)
)
.
By contradiction, if
cn(λ
∗
n(S)) = F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S)
)
−F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S)
)
,
then at equilibrium the potential function Φ is s.t.
F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S)
)
+
∑
j∈N
cj(λ
∗
j (S))
= F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S)
)
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=n
cj(λ
∗
j (S))
+ F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S)
)
− F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S)
)
= F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S)
)
+
∑
j∈N,j 6=n
cj(λ
∗
j (S)).
This implies that the potential function is minimal for λ∗n(S) =
0, and this contradicts the fact that the equilibrium is unique
and s.t. no agent is playing zero.
Step 2: Now, let η∗(S) be s.t.
cn(λ
∗
n(S, η
∗(S))) (39)
= F
(
1∑
j∈N,j 6=n λ
∗
j (S, η
∗(S))
)
− F
(
1∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (S, η
∗(S))
)
,
where λ∗(S, η∗(S)) is the local minimum of Φ on
[η∗(S), 1/σ2]s. Note that this η∗(S) is unique (as usual,
because the difference of the F ’s is a decreasing function and
the c is increasing). We show that η∗(S) > λ∗n(S). In fact, if
η∗(S) ≤ λ∗n(S), then λ∗j (S, η∗(S)) = λ∗j (S) for each j ∈ N ,
and we have shown in Step 1, that the equality in (39) does
not old for λ∗(S).
Step 3: We just need to show that this is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ(S, η∗(S)). At first, observe that no agent has incentives to
deviate to a quantity in (η∗(S), 1/σ2], because of the convexity
of Φ. It remains to be shown that no agent has incentives to
deviate to zero. Agent s does not have incentives by (39).
For any other agent i 6= n, s.t. λ∗i (S, η∗(S)) = λ∗s(S, η∗(S)),
if agent s, who is the most privacy concerned, does not have
incentives to deviate from λ∗i (S, η
∗(S)), that is still valid for i.
For any other agent i 6= n, s.t. λ∗i (S, η∗(S)) > λ∗s(S, η∗(S)), if
i does not have incentives to deviate to η∗(S), then, because of
the convexity of the cost function, she cannot have incentives
to deviate to 0.
K. Proof of Theorem 6
At first, because of Proposition 4, for each S ⊆ N ,
σ2M (λ
∗(S)) ≥ σ2M (λ∗(N)). Then, for the analyst it is
more convenient to have the complete set of agents playing.
Moreover, from the KKT conditions in Equation (38), when
implementing Γ
c′n(λ
∗
n(N)) =
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗(N)))
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (N, ))
2
,
as we assumed that λ∗n(N) 6= 1/σ2 (otherwise the estima-
tion would have been already optimal). When implementing
Γ(N, η∗(N)), or we have that λ∗n(N,λ
∗(N, η∗(N))) = 1/σ2,
and in this case we have proved our result. In fact, it follows
that every agent is playing 1/σ2 and that the estimation is now
optimal. If λ∗n(N,λ
∗(N, η∗(N))) 6= 1/σ2, then
c′n(λ
∗
n(N,λ
∗(N, η∗(N)))) =
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗(N, η∗(N))))
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (N, η
∗(N)))2
.
(40)
As
λ∗n(N,λ
∗(N, η∗(N))) > η∗(N) > λ∗n(N),
it follows that
c′n(λ
∗
n(N,λ
∗(N, η∗(N)))) > c′n(λ
∗
n(N)), (41)
because of the convexity of cn. Assume by contradiction that
σ2M (λ
∗(N, η)) ≥ σ2M (λ∗(N)),
it follows that
F ′(σ2M (λ
∗(N, η∗(N))))
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (N, η
∗(N)))2
≥ F
′(σ2M (λ
∗(N)))
(
∑
j∈N λ
∗
j (N, ))
2
,
and this contradicts (41).
L. Proof of Lemma 1
ΓP (η) is still a potential game, with potential function Φ
as in (23), but defined on the domain [η, 1/σ2]p. The set of
Nash equilibria of ΓP (η) is included in the set of the local
minima of Φ on this new domain. The unique local minimum
of Φ is given by λ∗(p, η) = λ∗(p), if λ∗(p) ≤ η, and by
λ∗(p, η) = η otherwise. In both the cases, this is a Nash
equilibrium, because of the convexity of the potential function
(any deviation of an agent would make her cost function
bigger).
M. Proof of Lemma 2
Because of Lemma 1, given a vector p in the first stage,
in the second stage the agents in P are going to choose a
precision level as in (21).
At first, we observe that (1, . . . , 1) is a Nash equilibrium
when η ∈ [λ∗(n − 1), η∗(n)]. As λ∗(n) < λ∗(n − 1) ≤ η, if
p = (1, . . . , 1), in the second stage, the agents are going to
play η at equilibrium, and if an agent decides to deviate to
pi = 0, the remaining n − 1 agents are still going to play η
at equilibrium. Then, by deviating to pi = 0, agent i cannot
make her cost function smaller, as
1
nη
+ cηk ≤ 1
(n− 1)η
by (33) as η ≤ η∗(n), where the left term represents her cost
before deviation, and the right one represents her cost after
deviation.
To prove that there are no other Nash equilibria, let η ∈
[λ∗(n− 1), η∗(n)]. Suppose by contradiction that there exists
an equilibrium s.t. the set N \ P of agents who choose zero
in the first stage is non-empty. Then, the agents in P choose
λ∗(p, η) at equilibrium in the second stage. Then, if λ∗(p) <
λ∗(p−1) < η, then an agent in N \P has incentives to deviate
choosing pi = 1. The same happens if η < λ∗(p) < λ∗(p−1).
While if λ∗(p) < η < λ∗(p − 1), then the agents in P have
incentives to deviate choosing pi = 0.
N. Proof of Theorem 7
At first, we observe that, because of Lemma 2,
σ2M (λ
∗(n, η∗(n))) < σ2M (λ
∗(n, η)) for each η ∈ [λ∗(n −
1), η∗(n)). In fact, when η ∈ [λ∗(n−1), η∗(n)], at the unique
equilibrium, every agent is choosing to participate in the first
stage and then she is choosing the same non-zero precision
level λ∗(n, η) and then the estimation has minimum cost when
this precision level is maximal, i.e. when it is equal to η∗(n).
When η ∈ [0, λ∗(n)], then for every vector p ∈ {0, 1}n
in the first stage, in the second stage the agents in N \ P
choose a precision level λ∗(n − p) and estimation cost is
σ2M (λ
∗(n− p)) ≥ σ2M (λ∗(n)) because of Corollary 2. When
η ∈ [λ∗(n), λ∗(n−1)], then for every vector p ∈ {0, 1}n with
p ≤ n−1 we have again, as before, a non-optimal estimation,
while we show that p = (1, . . . , 1) is not a Nash equilibrium.
In fact,
1
(n− 1)λ∗(n− 1) <
1
nη
+ cηk
for each k ≥ 2, and this means that each agent can make her
cost function smaller by deviating to zero.
Finally, when η ∈ [η∗(n), 1/σ2], for every vector p ∈
{0, 1}n in the first stage, in the second stage the agents in
N \ P choose a precision level equal to λ∗(n − p) or equal
to η and, as we have already seen in the proof of Theorem
3, this does not provide a minimum value for the estimation
cost.
O. Proof of Theorem 8
We prove at first that JA(n) is a definitely increasing
sequence, i.e., that JA(n) > JA(n− 1), implies JA(n+ 1) >
JA(n). We have that
JA(n) > JA(n− 1)
⇔F
(
1
nη∗(n)
)
+ Cn > F
(
1
(n− 1)η∗(n− 1)
)
+ C(n− 1)
⇔C > F
(
1
(n− 1)η∗(n− 1)
)
− F
(
1
nη∗(n)
)
.
As the right term decreases when n increases, and as the left
term is a constant, it follows that this inequality is definitely
true while n increases. Looking for the optimal n∗, we need
to find the highest n s.t. the previous inequality does not hold,
i.e., s.t.
C ≤ F
(
1
(n− 1)η∗(n− 1)
)
− F
(
1
nη∗(n)
)
.
It is now sufficient to observe that the term on the right
is equal, by definition of η∗(n) to c(η∗(n)). The highest n
for which this inequality holds, is the optimal number of
agents n∗. If this inequality is never satisfied, it means that
the estimation cost is increasing in n, and than the optimum
number of agents is 1.
